In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant diagnoses an antinomy of taste: either determinate concepts exhaust judgments of taste or they do not. That is to say, judgments of taste are either objective and public or subjective and private. On the objectivity thesis, aesthetic value is predicable of objects. But determining the concepts that would make a judgment of taste objective is a vexing matter. Who can say which concepts these would be? To what authority does one appeal? (...) On the subjectivity thesis, aesthetic value is not predicable of objects. But this threatens judgments of taste with a sort of relativism. Can we not firmly assert the aesthetic value of any object? Have we no authority to make criticisms of taste? Following John McDowell’s “Aesthetic Value, Objectivity and the Fabric of the World”, I will hold that aesthetic value is neither objective nor subjective, but rather intersubjective. But, contra McDowell, I will argue that the validity that intersubjective aesthetic value bestows on judgments of taste must assume an indeterminate absolute conception of reality, of the world as it is in itself. Only such a conceptual resource can in turn make intelligible the notion of a shared or common sense according to which a judgment of taste can be universally valid, that is, valid for all subjects. Finally, I will consider an objection to common sense in matters of taste. (shrink)

This essay deals with the problem of the status of colours, traditionally considered as the paradigmatic case of secondary qualities: do colours exist only as aspects of experience or are they real properties of objects, existing independently of human and animal perception? Recently, John Campbell has argued in favour of the simple view of colours, according to which colours are real properties of objects. I discuss the place of Campbell's position in a debated which was started by John Mackie (...) and continued by John McDowell, and defend it from a criticism due to Michael Smith. I conclude that the simple view is a philosophically credible position. Subsequently, I consider an alleged contradiction between the simple view and semantic externalism pointed out by Jim Edwards. I suggest that a supporter of the simple view may consistently maintain semantic externalism, if she also accepts epistemological externalism about the canonical warrant of perceptual judgements. (shrink)

Background: The magnitude of bullying and harassment among psychiatrists is reportedly high, yet no peer-review published studies addressing this issue could be found. Therefore, it was decided to conduct a pilot study to assess the degree of the problem, the types of bullying/harassment and to provide some insights into the situation.Methods and Principal Findings: Following multiple focus group meetings, a yes/no response type questionnaire was developed to assess the degree and type of bullying and harassment experienced by psychiatrists. Over a (...) 3-month period the questionnaire was administered to a random sample of 60 psychiatrists. 57 out of the 60 psychiatrists reported harassment and bullying. Frequencies of the following response variables are presented in descending order: rumours 40% ; defamation 20% ; passing remarks 20% ; false accusations 15% ; threats 13.3% ; verbal abuse 13.3% ; unjustified complaints 13.3% ; promotion blocked 13.3% ; humiliation 13% ; bad reference given 10% ; credentials questioned 8.3% ; physical attacks 5% ; termination 5% ; derogatory remarks 1.7% and 1.7% were subjected to personal work. As a result of being subjected to harassment, 66.7% of the psychiatrists did not take any action, whereas 33.3% confronted the person they believed responsible. Asked whether the bullying and harassment caused distress, 18.3% of the psychiatrists did not report any effect, 30% reported mild distress, 40% moderate distress and severe distress was reported by 11.7%.Conclusions: It was concluded that the magnitude of bullying and harassment among psychiatrists may be quite high, as evidenced by this pilot study. There is a need for extensive systematic studies on this subject and to establish strategies to prevent and address this issue at a national and regulatory level. (shrink)

The function of philosophy may be circumscribed as consisting in ma king a keen analysis of the peculiar nature of the crisis-situation, as it has existed among mell throughout th~ centuries of human history, and as it manifested itself in definite ways at the various stages of this his tory. That is to say, philosophy may be regarded as the discipline which, again and again, will have to determine the authenticity of man's ex istence in the light of the changing (...) conditions of life, i. e., man's chang ing needs and interests. Fundamentally, these needs may be regarded as being of a material, an intellectual, an aesthetical and a spiritual kind. On the grounds of the crisis, which inevitably exists among men on ac count of the controversial nature of their various truth-perspectives, as they are postulated on a personal level, in the sciences, in history, in the fine arts and in theology, man creates and re-creates the goods of civilization and the cultural values. The task of philosophy consists then in making an ever new assessment of man's changing needs, in terests and aspirations on the basis of the specific conflicts and prob lems with which man wrestles at a certain historical stage. It is in this way that the important philosophical systems were constructed, which we still admire to-day. (shrink)

Silence can be a communicative act. Tanesini (2018) demonstrates how “eloquent” silences can virtuously indicate resistance and dissent; in this paper, I outline one way silence can also be used viciously to cause discursive harm, specifically by slurring victims. By distinguishing between eloquent and “signaling” silences (two kinds of what I call “performative” silences), I show how “slurring” silences — fully quiet discursive moves that signal one's commitment to a slurring perspective — function in a manner that illuminates the pragmatic (...) topography of conversational silence in general. (shrink)

Within the philosophy of language, contextualists typically hold (and semantic minimalists deny) that pragmatic elements of an utterance can affect its semantic content. This paper concretizes this debate by analogizing both positions to different kinds of time-travel stories: contextualism is akin to Ludovician narratives that deny the possibility of temporal editing (or “the changing of past events”) while semantic minimalism is aligned with stories that allow the past to be literally altered. By focusing particularly on Denis Villeneuve’s 2016 film Arrival, (...) which portrays a Ludovician model of temporality that firmly denies the possibility of temporal editing, this paper defends the strength of the contextualist position. (shrink)

At the end of the last century Paul Tannery published an article on geometry in eleventh-century Europe, which he began with the following statement:“This is not a chapter in the history of science; it is a study of ignorance, in a period immediately before the introduction into the West of Arab mathematics.”.

This monograph is the first integral study of the views of the Austro-English philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein to appear in Soviet literature, and it is presented in close connection with an analysis of his relations with his contemporaries. The book sheds light on the sociocultural sources of Wittgenstein's philosophy, and it analyzes his book On Certainty for the first time, gives a new reading of his Notebooks, 1914-1916 and a number of other sketches, and very exhaustively treats his lectures on the (...) foundations of mathematics. The book is a critical analysis of the evolution of the philosophical views of Wittgenstein and sheds light on the personal motives behind his philosophical ideas and conceptions. (shrink)

Some moral sentimentalists say that ethical judgments just are our affective responses to the world and do not necessarily refer to or reflect anything beyond those emotional experiences. Moral sentimentalism tries to take seriously the psychological mechanisms that underwrite our making moral judgments. Moral sentimentalists treat feelings, or affective attitudes, as important components of moral theorizing and decision‐making. Fortunately, moral sentimentalists have a better option for measuring the appropriateness of our ethical feelings. Scottish philosopher Adam Smith's 1759 book The Theory (...) of Moral Sentiments remains a landmark defense of moral sentimentalism. In the 1970s, philosopher Cora Diamond talked about “fellow creature responses” as important starting‐points for thinking about our ethical sentiments regarding animals. Star Wars has shown us a similar kind of picture with a galaxy of different ways in which humans and nonhumans can interact. (shrink)

I have enjoyed my six years as editor of this journal. I was pleased to be able to bring the journal to Purdue University Press and learn how to produce a first-rate academic journal. From the early days of choosing a cover design, to supervising my graduate assistant Jiwon Kim as she expertly sought indexing services, to acquiring an ISSN number, to being lucky to convince David Granger to become the book review editor and, with the next issue, editor, I (...) have been fortunate to work with excellent colleagues. I particularly want to thank the staff at Purdue University Press, especially its former director, Thomas Bacher, who agreed to publish the journal in 2004. Tom later moved the management of the journal's .. (shrink)

Материалы конференции предназначены для специалистов.

The concept of service found in Christian theism and related religious perspectives offers robust support for a political defense of nonhuman animal rights, both in the eschaton and in the present state. By adapting the political theory defended by Donaldson and Kymlicka to contemporary theological models of the afterlife and of human agency, I defend a picture of heaven as a harmoniously structured society where humans are the functional leaders of a multifaceted, interspecies citizenry. Consequently, orthodox religious believers (concerned with (...) promoting God’s will “on Earth as it is in Heaven”) have a duty to promote and protect the interests of nonhuman creatures in the present, premortem state. (shrink)

At the present stage, the problem of human ecology is determined, for all practical purposes, by the response of man to the conditions of the environment he has himself modified and created.

Bateson's belated acceptance of the chromosome theory came in two main stages, and was permanent, although he retained to the end reservations about some implications and extensions of the theory. Coleman's attempt to explain Bateson's resistance in terms of his conservative mode of thought is critically examined, and rejected: the attributes Coleman assigns to Bateson are all either inappropriate, or irrelevant to chromosome theory, or both. Instead, the diverse factors which contributed to Bateson's resistance are enumerated and discussed. These include (...) deficiencies in the evidence then available to support the theory; embryological difficulties; Bateson's aversion to microscopy combined with the lack of a close colleague skilled in cytology; his iconoclastic temperament, and the fact that he found T. H. Morgan, the leader of the Drosophila school, an uncongenial personality. Taken together, these factors suffice to account for his resistance. Bateson's position is contrasted with that of the other most eminent opponent, W. Johannsen, whose organismic outlook was the main obstacle to acceptance. (shrink)